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FISH AND FEDERALISM:  
HOW THE ASIAN CARP LITIGATION 
HIGHLIGHTS A DEFICIENCY IN THE 
FEDERAL COMMON LAW 
DISPLACEMENT ANALYSIS 
Molly M. Watters* 
In response to the growing threat posed by the progress of Asian carp up the 
Mississippi River toward the Great Lakes, and with increased frustration with 
the federal response to the imminent problem, in 2010, five Great Lakes states 
sued the Army Corps of Engineers and the Metropolitan Water Reclamation 
District of Greater Chicago to force a more desirable and potentially more effective 
strategy to prevent the Asian carp from infiltrating the Great Lakes: closing the 
Chicago locks. This Note examines the federal common law displacement analysis 
through the lens of the Asian carp litigation. Both the Federal District Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois and the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit denied the plaintiff States’ request for a preliminary injunction, 
but allowed the plaintiffs to proceed with their federal common law claim against 
the Army Corps of Engineers. While both the district court and court of appeals 
correctly determined that the plaintiff States’ federal common law nuisance claim 
was not displaced by congressional action and could thus continue to the merits 
stage, both courts failed to recognize the important and fundamental federalist 
function, i.e., exercising their sovereign function, that the states were performing 
in bringing their suit. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since their introduction into the United States in the early 1970s, Asian 
carp have devastated the population of many native species in lakes and 
rivers. While most parties familiar with the Asian carp agree that their 
presence in the Mississippi River and the Great Lakes will wreak havoc on 
the native ecosystem and commercial fishing,1 there is no consensus on the 
best solution to the problem. This Note analyzes the legal prospects of one 
potential solution: restoring hydrological separation of the Mississippi 
River watershed and Great Lakes watershed by closing the Chicago Locks 
(the Chicago Area Waterway System or CAWS). In 2010, five Great Lakes 
States2 joined together to compel the Army Corps of Engineers (the 
Corps), which controls the Locks through federal agency delegation, and the 
Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago (the District) to 
take more drastic measures to stop the migration of the Asian carp. 
The States filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois that included a request for a temporary and 
permanent injunction to force the Corps to close the Locks under the theory 
of public nuisance. The district court denied their request for an injunction, 
finding that the plaintiff States had not sufficiently proven potential harm, 
meaning the district court was not convinced that the carp had reached or 
would reach the Great Lakes. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit denied the requested injunction for the same reason. While 
their request for injunction and appeal were denied, the States’ claim raised 
important federalism issues regarding administrative displacement in com-
mon law nuisance claims. 
Part I of this Note explains the States’ litigation seeking to force the 
closure of the Locks in federal district court and the Seventh Circuit. Part 
II analyzes the intricacies of causes of action when an issue such as this one 
                                                                                                                      
 1. Asian Carp Fact Sheet, MICH. DEP’T NATURAL RES., http://www.michigan.gov/ 
dnr/0,4570,7-153-10364_52261_54896-232231--,00.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2013). 
 2. Michigan is the lead plaintiff in the primary litigation regarding the Asian carp 
presence in the Great Lakes. Michigan is joined in this action by Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsyl-
vania, and Wisconsin (collectively known as the “States”) as plaintiffs and the Grand 
Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians as intervenor. See Michigan v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, No. 10–CV–4457, 2010 WL 5018559, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2010).  
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has been partially delegated to an administrative agency.3 Part III argues 
that when states are acting in their sovereign capacity, “special solicitude” 
must be given to their interests when determining whether their common 
law cause of action has been displaced by federal statutory law.  
I. RECENT LITIGATION OF THE DISPUTE 
Asian carp, specifically bighead and silver carp, are a collection of  
species native to Asia and imported to the United States for various  
reasons, including for experimental use in controlling algae in aquaculture 
and wastewater ponds.4 Bighead and silver carp are of particular concern 
due to their size (bighead carp can grow up to five feet long and weigh one 
hundred pounds) and ability to readily adapt to new environments.5 Asian 
carp have considerably upset, and even displaced, native fish populations 
and harmed fishing operations in rivers in the Mississippi River Basin.6  
Asian carp escaped from aquaculture ponds in the 1990s into the lower 
Mississippi River.7 Their population in that river has since increased expo-
nentially.8 As they have made their way up the Mississippi River, the 
potential impact of Asian carp in the Great Lakes has become particularly 
concerning.9 The Asian carp’s point of entry will likely be the Chicago Area 
                                                                                                                      
 3. Common law causes of action are displaced when Congress delegates its legislative 
power to an administrative agency, like the Corps. When the question of displacement 
arises, the analysis is not difficult; the court simply asks whether Congress has spoken 
directly to the question that has arisen. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 
U.S. 304, 315 (1981). However, the analysis can become more complicated when Congress 
was not explicit in its delegation and it must otherwise be decided by courts. 
 4. Asian Carp Fact Sheet, MICH. DEP’T NATURAL RES., http://www.michigan.gov/ 
dnr/0,4570,7-153-10364_52261_54896-232231--,00.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2013). 
 5. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 10–CV–4457, 2010 WL 5018559, 
at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2010). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Frequently Asked Questions, MICH. DEP’T NATURAL RES., http://www.michigan.gov/ 
dnr/0,4570,7-153-10364_52261_54896-226898--,00.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2013).  
 8. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 9, Michigan v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, No. 10–CV–4457, 2010 WL 5018559 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2010). 
 9. See BECKY CUDMORE ET AL., CAN. SCI. ADVISORY SECRETARIAT, Research Doc. 
2011/114, Binational Ecological Risk Assessment of Bigheaded Carps (Hypophthalmichthys spp.) 
for the Great Lakes Basin, at v (2011), available at http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/Csas-sccs/ 
publications/resdocs-docrech/2011/2011_114-eng.pdf. A binational risk assessment performed 
by a team of United States and Canadian scientists in 2011 found that without significant 
intervention, the ecological threat to the Great Lakes included an increase in competition 
for food between the Asian carp and native species, leading to a reduced growth rate in 
native species population. Id. Specifically, Asian carp have the ability to dramatically change 
the plankton composition of the body of water they inhabit. Because plankton form the base 
of the food chain in the Great Lakes, the introduction of Asian carp would substantially alter 
the Great Lakes’ ecosystem. Id. at 41. Interestingly, while this report examined a number of 
potential entry points for the Great Lakes, it identified the Chicago Area Waterway as the 
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Water System (CAWS),10 the manmade series of canals connecting the 
Mississippi River and Lake Michigan. Plaintiff States’ Attorneys General, 
along with state agencies, attempted to work outside of the court system 
with the Corps, the State of Illinois, and the District to find a satisfactory 
solution to halt the rapidly advancing Asian carp. When this path proved 
unsuccessful to the States, the Attorneys General decided to seek judicial 
remedies. The plaintiff States initially asked the Supreme Court for relief 
in 2010. Because CAWS has been the subject of a Supreme Court decree 
since 1929, the Supreme Court had the option to either reopen that decree 
or choose to exercise original jurisdiction over the dispute under Article III, 
Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution. After the Supreme Court declined 
either to reopen the decree or to exercise original jurisdiction,11 the plaintiff 
States initiated a cause of action in the Northern District of Illinois.12 
A. Asian Carp and the Chicago Area Waterway System 
All parties to the 2010 district court litigation are aware of the problems 
posed by the rapid migration of Asian carp, including the possibility that 
Asian carp could travel through the CAWS into the Great Lakes.13 Various 
agencies, including the Corps, proposed and studied potential responses to 
the migration, including responses specific to the CAWS that do not  
involve hydrological separation, or closing the Locks.14 
The CAWS is a series of manmade locks15 and canals connecting Lake 
Michigan to the Des Plaines River, which eventually feeds into the Missis-
sippi River. In 1900, the District and the State of Illinois reversed the flow 
of the Chicago River to prevent sewage from returning to the Chicago’s 
water supply, Lake Michigan.16 Canals were also built to connect Lake 
Michigan to the Mississippi River Valley through a series of locks known as 
                                                                                                                      
most likely point of entry for the Asian carp. Id. at v. The study also notes that because 
Asian carp have primarily established themselves in river systems, the exact ecosystem 
effects on a lake system are unclear. Id. at 41. 
 10. Id. at v. 
 11. Michigan v. Illinois, 130 S. Ct. 1166 (2010). 
 12. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 2010 WL 5018559. 
 13. See id. at *4. 
 14. Id. at *4-7. 
 15. Roughly seven million tons of cargo and 19,000 recreational boats pass through 
just one lock each year. Id. at *3. Locks, by raising and lowering water levels between disparate 
bodies of water, connect two bodies of water that because of their levels would otherwise not 
allow a canal (and therefore connection) to be built between them. 
 16. Id. at *2; JOEL BRAMMEIER ET AL., GREAT LAKES FISHERY COMM’N, PRELIMINARY 
FEASIBILITY OF ECOLOGICAL SEPARATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER AND THE GREAT 
LAKES TO PREVENT THE TRANSFER OF AQUATIC INVASIVE SPECIES 5–6, 10 (2008). Since 
1860, the Chicago River has been a central artery for industrial activity in the Chicago area. 
Id. at 10. 
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the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal.17 In addition to addressing sanitary 
concerns, the locks serve as a main artery of economic navigation18 and 
assist the Coast Guard in responding to emergencies and managing down-
stream flood control. The District and the Corps jointly operate the CAWS 
pursuant to federal authorizing statues.19 
B. Supreme Court Jurisdiction over the Dispute 
After attempting to work with the State of Illinois, the District, and the 
Corps on a satisfactory solution to the Asian carp problem, the States  
petitioned the Supreme Court to reopen the 1929 decree from the initial 
Chicago locks case, Wisconsin v. Illinois.20 Ultimately, the States were unsuc-
cessful in convincing the Court to hear the case, either under supplemental 
jurisdiction based on the decree, or under original jurisdiction.21 
In what is sometimes known as the Chicago Sanitary District case, the 
Supreme Court exercised original jurisdiction over a suit to enjoin Illinois 
and the Chicago Sanitary District from withdrawing water from Lake 
Michigan.22 The Court chose to retain continuing jurisdiction over any 
supplemental decree or decree modification regarding its order to prevent 
excessive diversion.23 The Court has since modified or supplemented the 
decree three times, most recently in 1967.24 Paragraph 7 of the 1967 decree 
specifically retains jurisdiction for the Court “for the purpose of making 
any order or direction, or modification of this decree, or any supplemental 
decree, which it may deem at any time to be proper in relation to the  
subject matter in controversy.”25 
On this basis, the States argued that the Asian carp posed a new specific 
harm that was not decided at the time of the 1967 decree: disruption of 
                                                                                                                      
 17. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 2010 WL 5018559, at *2–3. The Rivers 
and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, section 9, 33 U.S.C. § 401 (2006), authorized the 
Corps to build and oversee the connections between the watersheds. 
 18. Depending on the year, approximately 25 million tons of commodities move 
through CAWS each year along with 45,000–65,000 recreational vessels. BRAMMEIER ET AL., 
supra note 16, at 50. 
 19. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 2010 WL 5018559, at *3. Authorizing 
statutes for the Army Corps of Engineers include: sections 9 and 10 of the Rivers and 
Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-02, section 404 of the CWA, 33 
U.S.C. § 1344, and section 103 of the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 
1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1413. 
 20. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929). This is possible because all parties to 
the 1929 suit are present again in the Asian carp dispute.  
 21. Michigan v. Illinois, 130 S. Ct. 1166 (2010). 
 22. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. at 399. 
 23. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 696, para 7 (1930). 
 24. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 388 U.S. 426, 430 (1967). 
 25. Id. 
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native fish populations and commercial fishing.26 The States argued that the 
connectivity of the watersheds at issue in the initial decree puts this issue 
within the supplemental jurisdiction of the Court.27 The decree allows for 
further actions for relief or modification of the initial decree when a 
“changed circumstance or unforeseen issue not previously litigated arises.”28 
In order to invoke the Court’s continuing jurisdiction, the States must 
“show that [they] will suffer a substantial injury in the absence of the modi-
fication.”29 The States argued that the dangers and harm threatened by the 
presence of the Asian carp in the Great Lakes will cause a substantial injury 
without modification to the decree.30  
In addition to arguing for supplemental jurisdiction under the 1967  
decree, the States argued for original jurisdiction under Article III, Section 
2 of the U.S. Constitution, which grants the Court original jurisdiction over 
cases in which a state is a party.31 The States claimed to meet the two-prong 
test for granting original jurisdiction under Mississippi v. Louisiana.32 First, 
“focusing on the ‘seriousness and dignity’ of the claim,”33 the States argued 
they have a “vital interest” in protecting their waters and natural resources 
and that the presence of the Asian carp would pose serious economic and 
ecological harm to the States.34 Second, the States argued that they had no 
alternative forum for seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.35 Because the 
State of Illinois remains an “indispensable party,”36 the Court may exercise 
original and exclusive jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the Court denied the 
States’ petition for both continued jurisdiction of the 1967 decree and original 
jurisdiction without explanation.37 
                                                                                                                      
 26. Brief and Appendix in Support of Motion to Reopen and for a Supplemental 
Decree at 3, Michigan v. Illinois, 130 S. Ct. 1166 (2010) (Nos. 1–3, original). 
 27. Id. at 4–6. 
 28. Id. at 16 (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 619 (1983)). 
 29. Id. at 18. 
 30. Id. at 25. 
 31. See id. at 31. 
 32. Id. (citing Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73 (1992)). In determining whether to 
exercise original jurisdiction, the Court looks at two factors. Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 
73, 77 (1992). First, the Court assesses the nature of the dispute, “focusing on the ‘seriousness 
and dignity of the claim’ . . . .” Id. (quoting Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), 406 
U.S. 91 (1972)). Second, the Court considers the availability of an alternative forum. Id. 
 33. Brief and Appendix in Support of Motion to Reopen and for a Supplemental 
Decree, supra note 26, at 32 (quoting Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. at 77). 
 34. Id. at 32–33. 
 35. Id. at 33. 
 36. Id. The Court continues to hold the State of Illinois responsible for the mainte-
nance and control of the diversion project. Id. 
 37. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 130 S. Ct. 1166 (2010). According to Utah v. United States, 
394 U.S. 89, 95 (1969), original jurisdiction is to be used sparingly. However, Milwaukee I 
recognizes that the question of appropriateness “necessarily involves the availability of 
another forum where there is jurisdiction over the named parties, where the issues tendered 
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C. The Nuisance Suit and the APA 
After the Supreme Court denied their request to hear the case, the 
plaintiff States filed a complaint against the Corps and Chicago Sanitary 
District in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, seeking a 
preliminary and permanent injunction to compel the defendants to take all 
available measures to prevent the immigration of Asian carp into Lake 
Michigan and the Great Lakes watershed.38 In the litigation filed July 19, 
2010, the States contended that neither defendant had taken the necessary 
steps to abate a public nuisance (i.e., the Asian carp’s presence in the Great 
Lakes).39 The States alleged both a federal common law nuisance claim and 
a claim for judicial review of agency action under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA).40 In alleging the public nuisance claim, the plaintiffs 
needed to prove a “condition, action, or failure to act that unreasonably 
interferes with a right common to the general public.”41 The APA claim 
requested judicial review of agency action under 5 U.S.C. section 702, arguing 
that the plaintiffs “suffer[ed a] legal wrong because of agency action.”42 
The plaintiffs sought to compel the Corps to take specific measures to 
stop the spread of Asian carp into Lake Michigan and the Great Lakes. 
They requested that the Corps use the “best available methods to block the 
passage” of the carp.43 This request recognized that the “best available 
methods” may involve capturing or killing the Asian carp, rather than simply 
blocking the Asian carp’s entrance into Lake Michigan. Next, the plaintiffs 
asked that the Corps temporarily close the O’Brien Lock and Dam and the 
Chicago River Controlling Works. For other points of connectivity, the 
plaintiffs asked the Corps to install and maintain grates, screens, or block 
nets in order to prevent the Asian carp from migrating into Lake Michigan. 
In addition to the physical barriers, the plaintiffs requested both chemical 
and electronic barriers, and continuous monitoring for Asian carp  
in CAWS.44 Among these, the most dramatic remedy sought was the  
temporary closing and cessation of operation of the locks at the O’Brien 
Lock and Dam and the Chicago River Controlling Works. Closure of these 
locks would essentially separate the Great Lakes water system from the 
                                                                                                                      
may be litigated, and where appropriate relief may be had.” Illinois v. City of Milwaukee 
(Milwaukee I), 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972). Additionally, the Supreme Court’s exercise of original 
jurisdiction is discretionary. Id. at 108. 
 38. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 10–CV–4457, 2010 WL 5018559, 
at *1–2 (N.D. Ill. Dec 2, 2010). 
 39. Id. at *12. 
 40. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra note 8, at 26, 29. 
 41. Id. at 26. 
 42. Id. at 29. 
 43. Id. at 32. 
 44. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 2010 WL 5018559, at *1–2. 
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Mississippi River basin, halting shipping through the canals and recreational 
activities.45 
Prior to the litigation, the Corps and the District implemented an  
experimental Dispersal Barrier System (a system of multiple underwater, 
charged cables).46 The States argued that this would be insufficient to stop 
the Asian carp from entering the Great Lakes, because there are other 
routes for the carp to enter Lake Michigan, and eDNA47 evidence suggested 
that the barrier system does not work.48 The defendants, on the other hand, 
argued that the District and the Corps are continuing to work with state 
and local governments to prevent the Asian carp from entering the Great 
Lakes, and that the requested relief would “threaten public safety and flood 
control, substantially affect regional and national economies, and greatly 
disrupt transportation systems on which those economies rely.”49 The  
parties also disputed the presence of Asian carp in the CAWS, particularly 
the accuracy of the eDNA testing to assess the progression of Asian carp.50  
The district court denied the plaintiff States’ request for a preliminary 
injunction, on the basis that the States had not sufficiently proven potential 
harm, a requirement for granting a preliminary injunction. The court found 
that there was no evidence that the current electronic barrier51 had failed 
                                                                                                                      
 45. Id. at *1–2. Historically, the Chicago River flowed east into Lake Michigan, but 
currently flows west away toward the Mississippi. BRAMMEIER ET AL., supra note 16, at 5. 
The hydrological separation of the Mississippi River from the Great Lakes was one of the 
most significant geographical features of the Chicago area and the hydrological connection 
had been contemplated for 200 years. See id. at 8–10. Shipping from the Great Lakes to 
ports other than the port of Chicago (which is located on the canal, not Lake Michigan) 
would be impossible with the barrier because the hydrological separation would prevent 
water (and ships, boats, goods) from flowing from one body to another. 
 46. “An electric fish barrier consists of passing an electrical current through water, 
forming a barricade. Electric current passes between the electrodes via the water column and 
produces an electric field. The field is similar to a bell-shaped curve which is stronger at the 
center. The system is designed so that as a fish enters the electric field, the electric current 
makes them increasingly uncomfortable and they swim back the way they came.” Frequently 
Asked Questions, ASIAN CARP CONTROL, http://www.asiancarp.org/faq.asp#43 (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2013). 
 47. Environmental DNA (eDNA) is the detection of living organism’s genetic material 
by sampling the non-living environment (earth, wind, water). ENVTL. RES. CENTER FOR 
AQUATIC CONSERVATION U. NOTRE DAME, http://edna.nd.edu/Environmental_DNA_at_ND/ 
Home.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2013). 
 48. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra note 8, at 13–14. 
 49. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 2010 WL 5018559, at *12. 
 50. See id. at *16, *26. 
 51. “Electronic barriers are expected to be highly effective against fish but are ineffec-
tive on planktonic stages, as are acoustic and light barriers.” BRAMMEIER ET AL., supra note 
16, at 74. The first electronic barrier began operation in 2002; a second was added in 2009, 
but cannot be operated at full capacity and must be periodically shut down for maintenance; 
and a third barrier has been proposed. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, 
supra note 8, at 12–13. 
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and agreed with the Corps that the possibility of a self-sustaining population 
beyond the barrier and in the Great Lakes is “not imminent in a legal sense 
and remains unknown based on the characteristics of Asian carp and the 
Lake Michigan environment.”52 
“A party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate as a 
threshold matter that (1) its case has some likelihood of succeeding on the 
merits; (2) no adequate remedy at law exists; and (3) it will suffer irreparable 
harm if preliminary relief is denied.”53 More specifically, the Supreme 
Court has defined “irreparable harm” as the moving party demonstrating 
“that irreparable harm is likely in the absence of an injunction,” and that 
simply the possibility of harm is not sufficient.54 Courts balance two factors 
when considering injunctive relief: (1) the irreparable harm the moving 
party will suffer if the injunction is not granted, and (2) the harm the non-
moving party will suffer if the injunction is granted.55 This balancing test is 
supplemented by the consideration of the public interest served by the 
relief and effects on nonparties.56 
The States claimed relief under the APA as well as on the basis of  
federal common law nuisance. APA section 702 provides relief to “[a] person 
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or 
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is 
entitled to judicial review thereof.”57 The district court held that the States 
“have a minimal chance of success on the merits” of the APA claim, as the 
“evidence does not support the view that the Corps’ actions were wrong at 
all, much less arbitrary and capricious.”58 The district court was not  
persuaded by the evidence presented by the plaintiffs that the carp had 
reached the Great Lakes.59 With that, the Corps’ actions were not arbitrary 
and capricious because the evidence they used in their decisionmaking was 
sound. 
The court next addressed the plaintiff States’ nuisance claim. As a 
threshold matter, the sovereign immunity of the United States must be 
waived in order to proceed with a nuisance claim against a federal agency. 
The defendants argued that the purpose of the Federal Torts Claims Act 
                                                                                                                      
 52. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 2010 WL 5018559, at *13. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. (quoting Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 375–76 
(2008)). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at *14 (quoting Administrative Procedure Act § 702, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006)).  
 58. Id. at *15 (identifying Administrative Procedure Act § 706(2), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) 
(2006) as a means by which a court may “[h]old unlawful and set aside” any agency action 
that is “[a]rbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law”). 
 59. See id. at *27. 
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(FTCA)60 is to provide monetary damages to those wronged by the federal 
government, not to provide equitable relief, and therefore the court is pre-
cluded from “exercising jurisdiction over any freestanding cause of action 
based on the federal common law of nuisance.”61 Section 702 of the APA 
provided the waiver of sovereign immunity for the States’ APA claim, but 
the section’s waiver is not limited only to actions brought under the APA. 
Instead, it is a “law of general application” that reaches civil matters arising 
under federal law, including nuisance claims.62 The court decided that it 
“need not offer a definitive view on the difficult legal issue presented by” 
the sovereign immunity defense, however, in continuing to address the 
plaintiff States’ request for a preliminary injunction, because it did not find 
the defendant’s claims of sovereign immunity were persuasive.63  
The crux of the issue in the federal common law nuisance claim was to 
determine whether the existing federal statutory scheme displaced the 
plaintiff States’ cause of action. The district court stated that “[a] cause of 
action has been displaced when federal statutory law governs a question 
previously the subject of federal common law.”64 
The district court found that the statutory scheme did not displace the 
common law action and analogized this case to that of Illinois v. City of 
Milwaukee (Milwaukee I).65 In Milwaukee I, Illinois asked the Supreme 
Court to exercise original jurisdiction when it alleged, under a federal com-
mon law nuisance claim, that Milwaukee and its subdivisions discharged “raw 
or inadequately treated sewage” into Lake Michigan.66 While the Court 
declined to exercise original jurisdiction, it decided that the Water Pollution 
Control Act (the Clean Water Act or “CWA”), which controls discharges 
into navigable waters, did not displace Illinois’ federal common law cause of 
action.67  
The district court in Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers explained 
that the “federal statutes cited by Defendants and the City as having pur-
                                                                                                                      
 60. Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) (2006). 
 61. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 2010 WL 5018559, at *16. 
 62. Id. at *16–17 (quoting Blagojevich v. Gates, 519 F.3d 370, 372 (2008)). 
 63. Id. at *18. 
 64. Id. A full discussion of federal common law displacement can be found in Part II 
of this Note. 
 65. Id. at *20 (citing Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), 406 U.S. 91 (1972)). Cf. 
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II) 451 U.S. 304, 315 (1981) (holding that in order to 
displace the federal common law, the legislation must “[speak] directly to a question”). 
 66. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), 406 U.S. at 93 (1972). The procedural 
posture of this opinion is indicative of the unique character of original jurisdiction. This 
opinion is a denial of a motion to file a bill of complaint. The Supreme Court denied the 
motion, declining to allow Illinois the ability to file a complaint with the Supreme Court. Id. 
at 108. 
 67. Id. at 103–04 (“[T]he remedies which Congress provides are not necessarily the 
only federal remedies available.”). 
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portedly displaced federal common law do not comprehensively and specifi-
cally address the threat of an Asian carp invasion of Lake Michigan through 
the CAWS to the degree found in Milwaukee II,68 nor do they provide a 
specific mandate or methods for adequately addressing the threat.”69 A 
single mention of barriers in 16 U.S.C. section 4722(i)(3) to prevent the 
spread of aquatic nuisance species from the Great Lakes to the Mississippi 
River basin “is not a comprehensive program for preventing Asian carp 
introduction and establishment in the Great Lakes.”70 The court found that 
none of the laws cited by the defendants, “either individually or together, 
constitute the kind of all-encompassing scheme that would satisfy Milwau-
kee II.”71 “Those statues [cited by the defendants] simply do not approach 
the level of comprehensiveness, specificity, and all-inclusiveness found by 
the Supreme Court . . . in Milwaukee II.”72  
D. The Seventh Circuit Appeal of the Nuisance Claim 
Following the denial of a preliminary injunction in the district court, 
the States appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals for relief. 
Again finding a lack of evidence of probable harm, the States’ request for a 
preliminary injunction was denied. But according to its interpretation of 
the facts, the court of appeals found a greater likelihood of success on the 
merits than did the district court.73 While the district court found the 
States to have “at best, a very modest likelihood of success,”74 the court of 
appeals found “that the district court underestimated the likely merit of the 
states’ claim, particularly at this early stage of the case.”75 The States  
appealed to the Supreme Court.76 Their petition was denied, and on  
                                                                                                                      
 68. In Milwaukee II, the Court held that the permitting scheme enacted by Congress 
in response to Milwaukee I was comprehensive enogh to displace the common law. Milwau-
kee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304 (1981). 
 69. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 10–CV–4457, 2010 WL 5018559, at 
*20 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2010). The defendants cited the Aquatic Nuisance and Pollution 
Control section of Title 16, 16 U.S.C. § 4722(i)(3) (2006); the Water Resources Develop-
ment Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-114, § 3061(d) (2007); the amended Water Resources 
Development Act of 2010, H.R. 5892, 111th Cong. § 3013 (2010); and the Energy and Water 
Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 111-85, § 126 (2009), as 
federal statutes that displace the States’ federal common law claim. Michigan v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 2010 WL 5018559, at *5–6. 
 70. Id. at *20. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 770 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 74. Id. at 21. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 132 S. Ct. 1635 (2012). 
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December 3, 2012, the district court dismissed the case on separate 
grounds.77 
In discussing the displacement of federal common law, the court of  
appeals recognized the need for federal common law to “fill in ‘statutory 
interstices,’ and if necessary, even ‘fashion federal law’ ” in areas “within 
national legislative power.”78 The use of federal common law to govern 
interstate nuisance disputes stems from the needs of the federal system.79 
Invoking Tennessee Copper, the court recognized that “when the states joined 
the union and in doing so abandoned their right to abate foreign nuisance 
by force, ‘they did not thereby agree to submit to whatever might be done. 
They did not renounce the possibility of making reasonable demands on the 
ground of their still remaining quasi-sovereign interests; and the alternative 
to force is a suit in [the Supreme Court].’ ”80 Federal common law becomes 
essential when “there is an overriding federal interest in the need for a 
uniform rule of decision or where the controversy touches basic interests of 
federalism.”81 
More specifically, federal common law is available when dealing “with 
air and water in their ambient and interstate aspects.”82 The court of appeals 
went on to say, “we know that this body of law applies in a dispute about 
‘the pollution of a body of water such as Lake Michigan bounded, as it is, by 
four states.’ ”83 This is not an unlimited application of common law to any 
nuisance; rather, it is limited only to nuisance specific to those resources in 
their ambient aspects. The Supreme Court “has never ‘held that a State 
may sue to abate any and all manner of pollution originating outside its 
borders.’ ”84 This is an important distinction. The Corps argued that the 
common law does not apply here, as in it did in Milwaukee I, because the 
defendants were not emitting traditional pollutants, like waste water, as in 
Milwaukee I.85 The court of appeals quickly dismissed this argument:86  
                                                                                                                      
 77. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 10 C 4457, 2012 WL 6016926, at *15 
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 2012). Here, a different judge on the district court ruled that because the 
Corps was statutorily required to maintain navigation on the Great Lakes, the Corps’ failure 
to take steps to close the locks is not a public nuisance or in any way unlawful. Id. 
 78. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d at 770 (quoting Henry J. 
Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 
(1964)). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. (quoting Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)). 
 81. Id. (quoting Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), 406 U.S. 91, 105 n.6 
(1972)). 
 82. Id. at 771. “It is not uncommon for federal courts to fashion federal law where 
federal rights are concerned.” Id. (quoting Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 
448, 457 (1957)). 
 83. Id. (quoting Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), 406 U.S. at 105 n.6). 
 84. Id. (quoting Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2536 (2011)). 
 85. Id. 
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“A public nuisance is defined as a substantial and unreasonable interference 
with a right common to the general public, usually affecting the public 
health, safety, peace, comfort, or convenience,” and the court “know[s] of no 
rule saying that the defendants must emit a ‘traditional pollutant’ in order 
for federal common law to apply.”87  
When deciding whether federal common law was displaced, the court 
of appeals acknowledged that the displacement question “is whether  
Congress has provided a sufficient legislative solution to the particular 
interstate nuisance here to warrant a conclusion that this legislation has 
occupied the field to the exclusion of federal common law.”88 The court 
recognized that Congress has not been silent on Asian carp, but rephrased 
its concern by asking “how much congressional action is enough?”89 The 
court took issue with the defendants’ argument that “the delegation is what 
displaces federal law.”90 The delegation of authority over the CAWS “is one 
type of congressional action that is evidence of displacement,” but it is not 
necessarily a definitive one.91 The test remains “whether the statute 
‘speak[s] directly to [the] question.’ ”92 The court reasoned that, while  
Congress had spoken to the issue of Asian carp,93 the congressional action 
had “yet to reach the level of detail one sees in the air or water pollution 
schemes” found to displace the common law in American Electric Power Co. 
v. Connecticut94 and Milwaukee II.95 In order to displace the common law in 
Milwaukee II, the Court required there to be a “comprehensive regulatory 
program supervised by an expert administrative agency,” in which “[e]very 
point source discharge is prohibited unless covered by a permit.”96 Legisla-
tion passed regarding Asian carp “demonstrates that Congress is aware of 
the problem of invasive species generally, and carp in particular, [but the 
                                                                                                                      
 86. Id. The court also notes that “the defendants bear responsibility for nuisances 
caused by their operation of a manmade waterway between the Great Lakes and Mississippi 
watersheds.” Id. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. at 777. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. (quoting Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2538 (2011)). 
 91. Id. at 777–78. 
 92. Id. at 778 (quoting Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011)). 
 93. Congress has most recently attempted to address the issue through the proposed 
Stop Invasive Species Act, an amendment to the Transportation Bill that required the Corps 
to expedite its plan to block the carp from entering the Great Lakes. S. 2317, 112th Cong. 
(2012); H.R. 4406, 112th Cong. (2012). 
 94. AEP v. Connecticut held that “the Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes 
displace any federal common law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-
fuel fired power plants.” Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011). 
 95. Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 778–79 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 96. Id. at 777 (quoting City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 
317–18 (1981)).  
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legislation] falls far short of the mark set by the Clean Air Act or the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act.”97 “Congress has not passed any 
substantive statute that speaks directly to the interstate nuisance about 
which the states are complaining.”98 Notably, the Supreme Court recog-
nized that “Congress has not provided any enforcement mechanism or 
recourse for any entity or party negatively affected by the carp, and there is 
certainly no recourse to the courts under the minimal scheme that has been 
established.”99 
Similarly to the district court, the court of appeals found that the 
Corps did not benefit from sovereign immunity in a federal common law 
tort suit, holding that “the waiver contained in § 702 of the APA subjects 
the Corps to the plaintiffs’ common-law claims for declaratory and injunctive 
relief.”100 The court of appeals looked to congressional intent in amending 
the APA, noting that “it gave every indication that it intended to provide 
specific relief for all nonstatutory claims against the government.”101  
The point of digression between the district and appellate courts was 
the standard applied in analyzing the likelihood of success by the district 
court. Distinguishing the legal standard during the preliminary injunction 
and the merits stages, the court of appeals held that “a plaintiff in the  
former position needs only to show ‘a likelihood of success on the merits 
rather than actual success.’ ”102 This creates a lower “threshold for establish-
ing [the] likelihood of success.”103 The court of appeals determined that the 
district court missed this distinguishing factor: “[b]y applying directly the 
law of public nuisance, the judge seems to have required the plaintiff states 
actually to show that they were entitled to permanent injunction relief 
during the preliminary injunction hearing.”104 Instead, the States “needed 
only to present a claim plausible enough that (if the other preliminary 
injunction factors cut in their favor) the entry of a preliminary injunction 
would be an appropriate step.”105  
                                                                                                                      
 97. Id. at 779 (noting that the legislation regarding Asian carp does not rise to the all-
encompassing level of comprehensiveness that the Clean Air Act and Federal Water  
Pollution Control Act do). 
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. at 780. 
 100. Id. at 776. This does not, however, mean that common law claims rely on section 
702 for their cause of action; instead it provides immunity for common law claims. It is a 
mere coincidence that section 702 provides both a statutory cause of action and immunity 
from a common law cause of action. 
 101. Id. at 775–76. 
 102. Id. at 782 (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 
(1987)). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 782–83 (referencing the lower court’s finding “that the states ‘ha[d] not 
made a convincing case’ that the fish had pushed into the CAWS”). 
 105. Id. at 783. 
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However, the court of appeals upheld the district court’s denial of the 
preliminary injunction.106  
[T]he preliminary injunction the states have requested would  
impose substantial costs, yet given the current state of the record, 
we are not convinced that the preliminary injunction would assure 
much of a reduction in the risk of the invasive carp establishing 
themselves in Lake Michigan in the near future. That the balance 
of harms at this stage of the litigation favors the defendants might 
be enough by itself to support a conclusion that preliminary relief 
is not warranted, even though we have concluded that the states 
have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits and a 
threat of irreparable harm.107 
The district and appellate courts recognized that the plaintiff States’ 
federal common law cause of action was warranted and not precluded by 
federal displacement. While both courts agreed that the Corps’ authorizing 
statutes were not sufficient to displace the States’ common law cause of 
action, neither recognized the special status of the States in bringing federal 
causes of action in their sovereign capacity, as courts have in previous  
discussions of federal displacement.108 
II. ADMINISTRATIVE DISPLACEMENT OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW 
CAUSES OF ACTION AND STATES’ SOVEREIGN PROTECTION 
When analyzing the prospect of displacement of federal common law 
causes of action, courts apply the reasoning put forth in Milwaukee I and 
Milwaukee II, each of which analyzed the CWA’s permitting scheme. Both 
the district and appellate courts in the Asian carp litigation correctly decided 
that the Corps’ statutory authorization did not displace the States’ federal 
common law cause of action. However, their analysis failed to recognize the 
States’ unique position in making their claims. 
In the Asian carp litigation, both the district and appellate courts  
applied the administrative displacement reasoning found in the seminal 
cases, Milwaukee I and Milwaukee II, finding that a federal common law 
cause of action was not displaced by the Water Pollution Control Act, as it 
was in Milwaukee II. Following the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in  
Milwaukee I,109 Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
                                                                                                                      
 106. Id. at 800. 
 107. Id. at 795–96. 
 108. See, e.g., Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Inc., 206 U.S. 230 (1907). 
 109. In Milwaukee I, Illinois filed a motion for leave to file a bill of complaint, asking 
the Court to take original jurisdiction. While the Court denied Illinois’ motion on the 
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Amendments of 1972. Congress passed these amendments to the CWA in 
response to the City of Milwaukee’s action in Milwaukee I.110 The amend-
ments established a regulatory system that requires permits to discharge 
pollutants into the nation’s waters.111 The Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) is “charged with administering the Act [and] . . . has promulgated 
regulations establishing specific effluent limitations[;] those limitations are 
incorporated as conditions of the permit.”112 The Wisconsin Department of 
Natural Resources, under the supervision of the EPA, issued discharge 
permits to the City of Milwaukee.113 
After the Supreme Court denied Illinois’ motion for original jurisdiction 
in its Milwaukee I opinion, Illinois brought its claim to the district court.114 
The district court ruled in favor of Illinois’ federal common law nuisance 
claim.115 The city appealed, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed that the 
amendments did not displace Illinois’ federal common law nuisance 
claim.116 The City of Milwaukee appealed to the Supreme Court. 
A. Milwaukee II and the Displacement Analysis 
The parties in Milwaukee II asked the Court to decide whether the 
CWA amendments preempted or displaced Illinois’ federal common law 
nuisance claim.117 First, the Court recognized that the federal judiciary is 
not usually charged with the task of enacting and shaping federal rules.118 
However, “[w]hen Congress has not spoken to a particular issue . . . and 
when there exists a ‘significant conflict between some federal policy or 
interest and the use of state law,’ ” judge-made federal law is sometimes 
                                                                                                                      
grounds that (1) Illinois had an available remedy in a lower court and (2) the parties were 
not states, it nonetheless found that the federal common law had not been displaced. Illinois 
v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee I) 406 U.S. 91, at 103 (1972). 
 110. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 310 (1981). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 311. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 309. Because Milwaukee I was decided as a denial of a motion for leave to 
file a bill of complaint, Milwaukee II is a continuation of the same cause of action raised in 
Milwaukee I. 
 115. Id. at 311. 
 116. Id. at 312. 
 117. “Part of the confusion in this area of the law is attributable to inconsistent use of 
the terms ‘preemption’ and ‘displacement’ . . . . The Supreme Court has generally used the 
word ‘displacement’ to refer to the situation in which a federal statute supplants federal 
common law; conversely, the Court has used the word ‘preemption’ to refer to the more well-
known situation in which federal law supplants state law.” P. Leigh Bausinger, Note, Welcome 
to the (Impenetrable) Jungle: Massachusetts v. EPA, the Clean Air Act, and the Common Law of 
Nuisance, 53 VILL. L. REV. 527, 533 n.36 (2008). 
 118. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. at 312–13. 
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necessary.119 Even in these rare instances, federal common law is always 
“subject to the paramount authority of Congress.”120 The Court more  
specifically framed the question of displacement as “whether the [Amend-
ments] ‘spoke directly to [the] question.’ ”121 
In determining whether the amendments ‘spoke directly to the question,’ 
then-Associate Justice Rehnquist held that Congress “occupied the field 
through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program super-
vised by an expert administrative agency.”122 He used congressional intent 
to justify this interpretation of the purpose of the amendments, stating that 
they were viewed as a “total restructuring” and “complete rewriting.”123 
Rehnquist also turned to legislative history to show that Congress’ intent 
was to “establish an all-encompassing program of water pollution regulation.”124 
The comprehensive regulatory program, he reasoned, “strongly suggests 
that there is no room for courts to attempt to improve on that program with 
federal common law.”125 He may also have believed that giving courts the 
ability to entertain claims over agency actions may grant judicial oversight 
where Congress did not intend to do so.126 
Turning to the state permitting scheme under the CWA that was at  
issue in Milwaukee II, Rehnquist found that the administrative system  
addressed the problem at issue: overflows from sewage discharge. Thus, the 
federal courts had “no basis . . . to impose more stringent limitations than 
those imposed” under the regulatory scheme,127 since the regulatory scheme 
left no “interstice . . . to be filled by federal common law.”128 The Court 
held that “[t]he question is whether the field has been occupied, not whether 
it has been occupied in a particular manner.”129  
The Court went on to address the technical nature of water pollution 
control, holding that federal common law is particularly unsuited for com-
plex technical problems. The complex, technical nature of water pollution, 
the Court reasoned, is further evidence that Congress intended the issues to 
                                                                                                                      
 119. Id. at 313 (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, at 68 (1966)). 
 120. Id. at 313 (quoting New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 348 (1931)). 
 121. Id. at 315. 
 122. Id. at 317. 
 123. Id. at 317 (quoting HOUSE DEBATE ON H.R. 11896 (1972), reprinted in CONG. 
RESEARCH SERVICE, NO. 93-1, 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION 
CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972 350, 359 (1973)). 
 124. Id. at 318. 
 125. Id. at 319. 
 126. See Shell J. Bleiweiss, Environmental Regulation and the Federal Common Law of 
Nuisance: A Proposed Standard of Preemption, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 41, at 57 (1983). 
 127. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. at 320. 
 128. Id. at 323. 
 129. Id. at 324. 
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be resolved by an expert agency, in this case the EPA.130 The Court noted 
that Congress found its past displacement analyses to be “sporadic” and “ad 
hoc,” and the Court instead assumed that a comprehensive regulatory  
approach would provide a better solution to the problem.131 Administrative 
displacement eliminates some of the uncertainties inherent in the federal 
common law system because a federal agency is able to control the remedy 
through prospective regulation, rather than having the judiciary craft “ad 
hoc” remedies and states attempt to seek multiple avenues for addressing 
their claims.132 
Next, the Court found that the amendments gave states options for  
recourse within the statutory mechanism (the permitting scheme), support-
ing its decision that the amendments supplant the common law.133 The lack 
of forum to protect state interests was a main concern of the Court in Mil-
waukee I.134 The creation of an alternate forum for resolving interstate  
disputes showed congressional intent for the statute to represent the  
complete remedy.135 The availability of an alternate forum, like the adminis-
trative appeals system found in Milwaukee II, is critical to protecting a 
state’s interest in protecting its ambient air and water and should play a 
crucial role in the displacement analysis when states act to protect their 
sovereign interests. Without an avenue for redressing harms or wrongs 
(administrative or otherwise, as in tort), states unwittingly sacrifice sovereign 
ability to abate nuisances emanating from other states or outside sources 
through avenues such as the courts.136 
The Court later addressed Illinois’ argument that the amendments spe-
cifically preserve the federal common law. Section 505(e) states: “Nothing 
in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) 
may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any 
effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief 
against the Administrator or a State agency).”137 Contrary to Illinois’ 
urging, the Court adopted a narrow reading of this provision, limiting it to 
citizen suits.138 The Court recognized that Subsection 505(e) is “virtually 
identical to subsections in the citizen-suit provisions of several environmental 
                                                                                                                      
 130. Id. at 325. 
 131. Id. at 325. 
 132. See Bleiweiss, supra note 126, at 57. 
 133. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. at 326. 
 134. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), 406 U.S. at 93–94 (1972). 
 135. Bleiweiss, supra note 126, at 62. 
 136. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Inc., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907). 
 137. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (2006). 
 138. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. at 328. 
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statutes”; therefore it should be limited to citizen suits, not actions brought 
by states.139  
Ultimately, the majority concluded that three factors go into determining 
whether a statute displaces the common law. First, Congress must intend 
the regulation to be comprehensive. Second, the act must regulate every 
instance of a particular act (and empower an expert agency to supervise and 
direct this scheme). Finally, the Court recognized the importance of states’ 
ability to seek relief when wronged and, in order to displace the common 
law, the statutory scheme must provide states the ability to seek redress or 
participate in the permitting process.  
B. Blackmun’s Dissent 
Writing for the dissent, Justice Blackmun found flaws in the majority’s 
reasoning that Congress intended for the amendments to displace the  
federal common law in this instance.140 Blackmun argued for requiring more 
explicit Congressional intent to displace the common law, finding that an 
“automatic displacement” is inadequate, and rejecting the majority’s finding 
of intent to enact a comprehensive regulatory scheme.141 He argued that the 
Court improperly took Congress’ intent to enact a comprehensive regulatory 
scheme as a proxy for its intent to displace the common law.142 Blackmun 
argued that the mere displacement of federal common law by Congress 
through a regulatory or permitting scheme was not sufficient to satisfy the 
needs of states or other parties provided by common law.143 
First, Blackmun faulted the Court’s assumption that congressional  
action addressing a specific question automatically removes the need for 
federal common law.144 He argued that “automatic displacement” is flawed 
because it both “fails to reflect the unique role federal common law plays in 
resolving disputes between one State and the citizens or government of 
another” and ignores the “frequent recognition that federal common law 
may complement congressional action in the fulfillment of federal policies,” 
rather than be replaced it.145 He took particular interest in the ability of 
federal common law to assist in the resolution of interstate disputes and 
                                                                                                                      
 139. Id. 328–29. 
 140. Id. at 333–34 
 141. Id. at 334. 
 142. Id. at 333–34. 
 143. Id. at 334. The Seventh Circuit echoed this differentiation in denying a prelimi-
nary injunction in the Asian carp case, noting that a comprehensive regulatory scheme is 
evidence of intent to displace, but not dispositive of that intent. Michigan v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, No. 10–CV–4457, 2010 WL 5018559, at *19 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2010) (“Apparent 
comprehensiveness of Congressional legislation is only one indication of displacement.”). 
 144. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. at 333–34. 
 145. Id. at 334–35. 
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expressed concern that without federal common law causes of action,  
disputes would remain unaddressed.146 He grounded his argument in Article 
III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, which “explicitly extends the  
judicial power of the United States to controversies between a State and 
another State or its citizens, and [the] Court, in equitably resolving such 
disputes, has developed a body of ‘what may not improperly be called  
interstate common law.’ ”147  
The historical basis of this reasoning came from the 1907 case Georgia v. 
Tennessee Copper Co.148 Blackmun used Tennessee Copper to illustrate each 
state’s long-held right “to be free from unreasonable interference with its 
natural environment and resources when the interference stems from  
another State or its citizens.”149 The Court in Tennessee Copper famously 
recognized the special status of states in regards to their natural resources, 
stating:  
When the States by their union made the forcible abatement of 
outside nuisances impossible to each, they did not thereby agree to 
submit to whatever might be done. They did not renounce the  
possibility of making reasonable demands on the grounds of their 
still remaining quasi–sovereign interests; and the alternative to 
force is a suit in this court.150  
Blackmun next reframed the question the Court dealt with as “whether, 
given its presumed awareness [of the relevant common law history],  
Congress, in passing these Amendments, intended to prevent recourse to 
the federal common law of nuisance.”151 This, he reasoned, required a more 
significant inquiry into congressional intent than whether Congress has 
simply spoken to the problem; rather, it required specific congressional 
intent to displace the common law.152 Addressing the complex problems of 
water pollution by enacting the 1972 Amendments “should not be taken as 
presumptive evidence, let alone conclusive proof, that Congress meant to 
foreclose pre-existing approaches to controlling interstate water pollution.”153 
                                                                                                                      
 146. Id. at 223–36. 
 147. Id. at 335 (quoting Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 98 (1907)). 
 148. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907). 
 149. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. at 335. 
 150. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237. 
 151. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. at 338. 
 152. Id. at 338–39. 
 153. Id. at 338. 
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Next he addressed the language of subsection 505(e). He argued that 
the language of the statute154 preserved the right of states, which are included 
in the statute’s definition of “person,” to bring an action “against the  
governmental entities who are charged with enforcing the statute.”155 
Blackmun cited additional evidence to support his claim that Congress did 
not intend to extinguish the federal common law of nuisance, including the 
lack of a “unitary enforcement structure,” noting that states may choose to 
enact more stringent pollution standards.156 “Thus, under the statutory 
scheme, any permit issued by the EPA or a qualifying state agency does not 
insulate a discharge from liability under other federal or state law.”157 
Blackmun also took issue with the legislative history used by the Court 
to conclude that the comprehensive statute was intended to displace the 
common law: “The fact that legislators may characterize their efforts as 
more ‘comprehensive’ than prior legislation hardly prevents them from 
authorizing the continued existence of supplemental legal and equitable 
solutions to the broad and serious problem addressed.”158 Blackmun went on 
to cite a Senate Report that explicitly describes the congressional intent of 
section 505(e) to avoid displacing rights or remedies offered by other laws 
(including the availability of damages).159 The Senate, in its report, noted 
that “section [505(e)] would specifically preserve any rights or remedies 
under any other law” and “[c]ompliance with requirements under [the 
amendments] would not be a defense to a common law action for pollution 
damages.”160 This language, recognizing a continued right to bring a 
common law cause of action, shows that Congress did not intend to  
preclude those actions. 
Finally, the availability of the administrative mechanism of notice and 
hearing,161 according to Blackmun, should not preclude the option of  
                                                                                                                      
 154. “Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of 
persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek . . . any other relief.” Id. at 338 
(quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (2006)). 
 155. Id. at 339–40. 
 156. Id. at 340–41. Because Congress was open to the suggestion that states enact more 
stringent pollution control mechanisms, it can be reasoned that it did not see its action in 
the instant case as an all-encompassing regulation for water pollution.  
 157. Id. at 341. 
 158. Id. at 342. 
 159. Id. at 343. 
 160. Id. at 343 (quoting S. Rep. No.92-414, at 81 (1971)). 
 161. Notice and hearing (along with notice and comment rulemaking) allows anyone 
(states, non-profits, citizens, etc.) to give comments to agencies prior to their final action. 
Agencies are then required to address all meaningful comments from participants in taking 
its action. United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 
1977) (“It is not in keeping with the rational process to leave vital questions, raised by 
comments which are of cogent materiality, completely unanswered.”). 
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judicial remedies.162 Nothing in section 402, the notice and hearing process, 
“suggests that a neighboring State’s participation in the permit-granting 
process is anything other than voluntary and optional.”163 The legislative 
history showed that the Conference Committee expressly rejected partici-
pation in the administrative mechanism as a jurisdictional bar. A showing 
that legislative history anticipated the creation of a notice and hearing 
administrative procedure did not foreclose a federal common law action, 
without explicitly saying so.164  
C. Displacement after Milwaukee II 
The holding in Milwaukee II has been read to recognize two types of 
displacement: field displacement and conflict displacement. The ambiguity 
posed by the dual readings of Milwaukee II has created continued uncertainty 
in displacement analysis. Field displacement occurs when legislation is so 
extensive and complete that it amounts to “occupy[ing] the field.”165 The 
field displacement rationale further holds that Congressional silence on a 
particular issue should be read to mean that the legislation is sufficiently 
comprehensive and complete that there is no remaining interstices for 
federal common law to supplement and that Congress intended for the 
legislation to be all-inclusive, even when Congress legislates comprehen-
sively.166 It can then be argued that “[s]ilence in the midst of  
comprehensiveness instead means that Congress intended to leave a subject 
unregulated.”167 Without Congress explicitly signaling otherwise, Merrill 
argues that courts will probably read such silence to mean Congress did not 
intend for the federal common law to be displaced.168 
Alternately, conflict displacement occurs when legislation specifically 
addresses the particular action or remedy that gives rise to the common law 
claim.169 Whether conflict displacement has occurred may be determined by 
asking “whether Congress has provided an effective regulatory mechanism,” 
different than that possible under common law, for dealing with a particular 
pollution problem.170 This rationale comes from the understanding that 
common law remedies are assumed in certain disputes and those common 
                                                                                                                      
 162. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. at 345. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 345–46. 
 165. Bausinger, supra note 117, at 548.  
 166. Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 
293, 313 (2005). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See id. 
 170. Id. at 311–13. 
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law remedies should be expected to remain available unless Congress  
explicitly spoke to that particular type of dispute.171 
Recently the Court took up the question of displacement of federal 
common law by the Clean Air Act in AEP v. Connecticut. The Court applied 
the conflict displacement rationale, finding that the Clean Air Act displaces 
the “common law right to seek abatement” of carbon dioxide pollution as a 
public nuisance.172 The Court took great interest in the Clean Air Act’s 
avenues for enforcement in holding that the Act provides the same relief as 
sought through federal common law.173 Justice Ginsberg, writing for the 
majority, held that Congress delegated the regulation of carbon dioxide 
emissions to the EPA and that EPA’s decision not to regulate is within that 
delegated power.174 “The critical point is that Congress delegated to EPA 
the decision whether and how to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions from 
power plants; the delegation is what displaces federal common law.”175 
Simply because the agency chose not to regulate does not give the federal 
courts authority to use federal common law to overturn that agency  
decision.176 Again, the Court recognized the need to defer to the EPA’s 
expertise and prevent “ad hoc, case-by-case injunctions.”177 
Both the district and appellate courts correctly concluded that the 
States were entitled to bring a federal common law cause of action to abate 
the Asian carp public nuisance. However, the ambiguity in the effects of 
displacement (either field displacement or conflict displacement) highlights 
one of the deficiencies in the displacement analysis. Particularly when 
States are acting in their sovereign capacity, courts must recognize a State’s 
obligation to protect themselves from out-of-state sources of pollution.  
CONCLUSION 
In deciding whether a common law cause of action was displaced when 
states are exercising their sovereign rights, courts should not only go 
through the Milwaukee II displacement analysis, but they must also consider 
additional relevant factors in deciding cases regarding states sovereignty. 
Specifically, courts should apply similar reasoning to the displacement 
analysis as has been discussed in the standing requirement and availability 
of alternative forums. The Court has previously recognized the special 
                                                                                                                      
 171. Id. at 313. 
 172. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011). 
 173. Id. at 2538. 
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 176. Id. at 2538–39. 
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status of states in these analyses, and must continue to do so in the dis-
placement analysis. 
Most recently in Massachusetts v. EPA, when discussing the standing  
requirement, the Court recognized the special status of the state of Massa-
chusetts in bringing a claim as a sovereign entity. In discussing Massachusetts’ 
standing to challenge an EPA rulemaking petition, the Court recognized 
that Massachusetts has an “independent interest ‘in all the earth and air 
within its domain’ ” and in protecting its sovereign territory.178 The Court 
specifically references the dignity of states, which are not “mere provinces 
or political corporations”; in the standing determination, it is significant if 
the plaintiff is a state acting as a sovereign.179 The Court notes that states 
give up certain powers when entering the Union, including traditional 
dispute resolution methods, such as invading or negotiating a treaty.180 
Because states give up such power to the federal government, they are 
forced to rely on federal agencies and Congress to protect their interests.  
The specific federalism issues at stake when states are unable to bring 
common law causes of action to abate nuisances originating in other states 
have been recognized in the Court’s decisions since Tennessee Copper. 
Bausinger highlights the “special solicitude” given to Massachusetts due to 
its sovereign status.181 This special solicitude given to Massachusetts in its 
attempt to protect its quasi-sovereign interest is as applicable in the  
displacement analysis as in the standing analysis. In further recognition of 
the special federalism concerns arising out of interstate conflicts, courts 
note the need for remedies, when not provided by statute, in “what may not 
improperly be called interstate common law.”182 
The special status afforded to states when bringing action against other 
states in their sovereign capacity originates in Justice Holmes’ majority 
opinion in Tennessee Copper v. Georgia. In an action to enjoin Tennessee 
Copper Company from releasing noxious gas over Georgia territory, 
Holmes stated,  
The case has been argued largely as if it were one between two  
private parties; but it is not . . . . This is a suit by a state for an  
injury to it in its capacity of quasi-sovereign. In that capacity the 
                                                                                                                      
 178. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007). 
 179. Id. (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999)).  
 180. Id. at 519 (“Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode Island to force reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions, it cannot negotiate an emissions treaty with China or India, and 
in some circumstances the exercise of its police powers to reduce in-state motor-vehicle 
emissions might well be pre-empted.”). 
 181. Bausinger, supra note 117, at 539. 
 182. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 98 (1907). 
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state has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its  
citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain.183  
In acknowledgment of state sovereignty in bringing nuisance abatement 
claims, courts distinguish the need for alternate forums, state participation, 
and remedies as valid and unique considerations when dealing with state 
claims of right under federal common law. 
Alternate forums, such as administrative or other means for addressing 
disputes available to parties, when statutorily created, may suggest that 
Congress decided the statutory remedy was to be the entire remedy.184 In 
order for a statute to speak directly to the question at issue in the common 
law claim, as required to displace the common law cause of action, “a federal 
statute must provide some recourse for the problem at issue in the federal 
common law claim.”185 The merits of remedies (statutory or common law) 
may be debated, and it is reasonable to argue that a coordinated, compre-
hensive statutory and regulatory framework may be preferable.  
Yet in the Asian carp litigation, no such framework existed; a patch-
work of statutes gives the Corps jurisdiction over the infrastructure critical 
to the Asian carp’s spread, rather than a comprehensive framework like the 
CWA’s permitting scheme in Milwaukee II.186 Therefore, states must be 
afforded a forum to assert their common law rights. It falls to the federal 
courts to “provide a venue for states to seek abatement” when they are 
furthering “a quasi-sovereign interest in protecting their citizens.”187 The 
plaintiff States recognized the importance of forums in their petitions to 
the Supreme Court urging it to exercise either continuing or original juris-
diction over the Asian carp dispute. 
States must also be afforded the right to participate in the administrative 
process. In Milwaukee II, the Court addressed one of the serious concerns of 
Milwaukee I:  
It is also significant that Congress addressed in the 1972 Amend-
ments one of the major concerns underlying the recognition of 
federal common law in [Milwaukee I]. We were concerned in that 
case that Illinois did not have any forum in which to protect its  
interests unless federal common law were created . . . . The statutory 
scheme established by Congress provides a forum for the pursuit of 
                                                                                                                      
 183. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Inc., 206 U.S. 230, 236–37 (1907). 
 184. Bleiweiss, supra note 126, at 62. 
 185. Ken Alex, A Period of Consequences: Global Warming as Public Nuisance, 43 STAN. J. 
INT’L L. 77, 88 (2007). 
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 187. Sean Mullen, Note, The Continuing Vitality of the Climate change Nuisance Suit, 63 
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such claims before expert agencies by means of the permit-granting 
process.188 
Administrative involvement is not the only way in which a state’s interest 
may be furthered. Because of the technical nature of many environmental 
nuisance claims, the Supreme Court is often reluctant to hear interstate 
claims under original jurisdiction.189 “While [Milwaukee II] is now a century 
old, the Court’s struggle with technical complexity, scientific uncertainty 
regarding distant causation, and complicating conduct in the affected state 
has continued to this day.”190 However, it can be noted that complex and 
technical matters are not wholly insurmountable for the Court. The practice 
of appointing Special Masters is frequently used when the Court invokes 
original jurisdiction.191 Technical and fact-specific environmental disputes, 
like the Asian carp litigation, have also contributed to the Court’s preference 
for alternative solutions to dealing with interstate environmental claims.192 
Legislative solutions (including administrative remedies) and interstate 
bargaining are cited as two avenues to satisfy the concern about state partic-
ipation. However, both of these methods frequently do not provide an 
adequate resolution.193 Ultimately, due to the nature of the problems and 
solutions, interstate environmental issues need to be solved through federal 
regulatory programs.194 In the case of Asian carp, for example, a compre-
hensive and effective regulatory scheme dealing with the invasive fish 
would be preferable to each state or municipality attempting to achieve the 
same goal through various means. The Court has noted that agency  
involvement in a regulatory scheme that allows for state participation, like 
the CWA, is one way to resolve interstate pollution issues.195 In the case of 
water pollution, however, it can be argued that the EPA “should act as an 
arbitrator of interstate disputes.”196  
Another option—interstate bargaining for congressionally approved 
compacts197—allows full state participation in dealing with interstate  
                                                                                                                      
 188. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 325–26 (1981). 
 189. See Noah D. Hall, Political Externalities, Federalism, and a Proposal for an Interstate 
Environmental Impact Assessment Policy, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 49, 64 (2008). 
 190. Id. at 65. 
 191. See id. at 67. 
 192. See id. at 70. 
 193. Id. It may also be argued that since the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment, 
states are no longer represented in their sovereign capacity in the legislative process. 
 194. See id. 
 195. See id. at 74. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Article 1, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution permits states to enter into  
compacts, subject to Congressional approval. U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 3.  
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environmental harms.198 Compacts are agreements between states enacted 
through state legislatures, subject to congressional authority.199 “Since most 
interstate environmental harms are regional rather than national in scope, 
compacts between the few interested and affected states make more sense 
than federal involvement.”200 Unfortunately, interstate compacts are rare 
due to the high political costs of entering into such compacts.201  
Finally, statutory remedies provide another avenue by which state  
interests may be furthered. In County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, the 
Court explicitly recognized the necessity of remedies in a statute in order 
for that statute to displace the common law.202 The Court stated that “the 
Nonintercourse Act does not speak directly to the question of remedies for 
unlawful conveyances;” thus, no displacement is found.203 This explicit 
recognition of remedies as a factor in the Court’s decision on common law 
displacement acknowledges a litigating party’s rights to some sort of resolu-
tion of the issue at hand. It is true that Oneida did not involve a state 
party,204 but the case recognizes that litigants have certain interests in the 
outcome that must be addressed, either by statute or common law. 
Statutory remedies may satisfy the sovereign interests of states and are 
frequently considered in the displacement discussion. AEP demonstrates 
that remedies are an important indicator of displacement. In citing to  
Onieda, the AEP Court was unequivocal about the importance of remedial 
provisions in the displacement calculations. To determine whether the CAA 
displaces the action at issue in AEP, the Court cited ongoing enforcement 
and administrative penalties for noncompliance as proper statutory remedies 
satisfying the need for remedial measures.205 The CAA goes even further in 
that “[i]n specified circumstances, the Act imposes criminal penalties on 
any person who knowingly violates emissions standards issued under [the 
Act].”206 
                                                                                                                      
 198. See Hall, supra note 189, at 75. While this Note does generally not address issues 
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 199. Id. at 76. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 77. 
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Statutory remedies are not necessarily preferable, but arguably, a  
coordinated, comprehensive regulatory framework is preferable to states 
bringing suit against a range of agencies and industries. Without such a 
comprehensive solution, however, courts must be able to exercise jurisdic-
tion.207 The availability of remedial measures, particularly when state 
sovereignty is at issue, closes the interstices common law remedies are 
meant to fill.208 
Ultimately, as shown through the lens of the Asian carp litigation,  
sovereign interests must be protected when states seek to protect their 
national resources. Because the plaintiff States in Michigan v. Army Corps of 
Engineers were left without any administrative remedy, they sought protec-
tion of their sovereignty through the federal court system. While at this 
point their victory on the point of federal common law may seem pyrrhic, 
the case was nonetheless an important reminder of states’ need to protect 
their sovereignty over the air and water in their territory. As recognized in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, one state may not invade another to protect its interest 
in the ambient air, water, or even land.209 Courts must continue to recognize 
the important principles highlighted in that sentiment and in Tennessee 
Copper when deciding whether a state’s cause of action is displaced by Con-
gressional delegation. Without such recognition, states’ ability to effectively 
care for their natural resources may be irreparably harmed. 
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